

# Securing High-Risk Django Applications

## Lessons from the Payment Domain





INCIDENT ALERT  
RESPONSE REQUIRED  
CHANNEL 1



02:17

INCIDENT ALERT  
RESPONSE REQUIRED  
CHANNEL 1

# Sounds familiar?

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# Hi, I'm Dmytro




- **15+ years professional experience**
- **Today - Tech Lead in Payments team at Preply**
- **Interests - big data, cybersecurity, endurance sports**
- **Bias - I've spent more time on what goes wrong than what goes right**

# We are building a tutor-led, AI enhanced learning platform

## The best Marketplace

A marketplace of amazing tutors, supported by best-in-class classroom, scheduling & tools




**>2M**  
Active Learners

**100K**  
Active Tutors

## Enhanced with AI

A learning platform where your tutor experience super-powered with AI



**2M**  
Monthly Lessons

**1000+**  
clients  
(B2B business)



02:17

INCIDENT ALERT  
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# Payments are unforgiving

## Critical

Attackers are paid to find your bugs.  
The threat model is professional.

## Auditable

Regulators, processors, and finance  
will ask: show me.

## Irreversible

A wrong charge becomes a refund,  
a CS ticket, and a chargeback fee.

# Django defaults are great... for blogs

## Usually fine

- | `auto_now / auto_now_add` on timestamps
- | `DEBUG = False` in production
- | `CSRF + SecurityMiddleware` enabled
- | `django.contrib.auth` password hashing

## Re-evaluate for money

- | `model.save()` mid-request, no locks
- | `ATOMIC_REQUESTS` hides transaction boundaries
- | `ModelAdmin` with full edit on financial tables
- | Errors swallowed by generic 500 handlers

# 6 Lessons to protect your payment system


**... and your sleep**

# 01


# Transaction integrity & race conditions

*If two requests can race, they will.*


# Payment flow



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# Reads, then writes - without protection

```
def add_funds(user_id, amount):  
    wallet = Wallet.objects.get(user_id=user_id)  
    wallet.balance += amount  
    wallet.save()
```

## Two requests, same wallet

- Both read balance = 100
- Both add 50
- Both write 150
- One deposit silently lost

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# Lock the row, not the request

```
from django.db import transaction

with transaction.atomic():
    wallet = Wallet.objects
        .select_for_update()
        .get(user_id=user_id)
    wallet.balance += amount
    wallet.save()
```

- **Atomic boundary:** explicit, request-scoped, short-lived.
- **select\_for\_update:** row-level pessimistic lock at the DB.
- **Long locks = outages.** Keep transactions tiny.

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
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
# Idempotency

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
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# Idempotency keys - same key, same outcome



- 01** Key is the client's responsibility, scoped per endpoint.
- 02** First-write-wins via a DB UNIQUE constraint, not app logic.
- 03** Cache the response, not just the fact - replays must be byte-identical.

# 03

## State machines

*If two requests can race, they will.*

# State machines, not status strings

```
# Anywhere in the codebase:  
payment.status = "captured"    # unenforced  
payment.save()
```

- | **Invalid transitions** raise loudly - at the source.
- | **Audit trail** is a free side-effect.
- | **Reviewers** can reason about flows in one place.

# State machines, not status strings

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# Anywhere in the codebase:  
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# State machines, not status strings

```
# Anywhere in the codebase:
payment.status = "captured" # unenforced
payment.save()

# Explicit transitions instead:
ALLOWED_STATUSES = {
    "authorized": {"captured", "voided"},
    "captured": {"refunded"},
    "refunded": set(),
    "voided": set(),
}

def transition(payment, new_status):
    if new_status not in ALLOWED_STATUSES[payment.status]:
        raise InvalidTransition(payment.status, new_status)
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
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
## Abuse defenses

*Anything you accept once, you'll be asked to accept a million times.*


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# Webhook signatures, done right

```
import hmac, hashlib

def verify(raw_body, header_sig, secret, timestamp):
    if abs(now - timestamp) > MAX_SKEW_SECONDS:
        raise PermissionDenied("stale webhook")
    expected = hmac.new(
        secret, raw_body, hashlib.sha256
    ).hexdigest()
    if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, header_sig):
        raise PermissionDenied("bad signature")
```

- **Timestamp** - reject outside a  $\pm 5$  min window.
- **Raw bytes** - sign-then-parse, not parse-then-sign.
- **compare\_digest** - reduces timing attacks.
- **Key rotation** - accept N and N-1 during overlap.

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# Rate limiting and abuse signals

<b>1</b>	<b>In-process</b>	Django throttling: per user, per IP, per endpoint.
<b>2</b>	<b>At the edge</b>	WAF / API gateway rules for tracking attacks.
<b>3</b>	<b>Velocity</b>	Too many cards per user, users per card, failed auths.
<b>4</b>	<b>Signals</b>	Feed anomalies to a fraud system and don't block in the request path.

# 05

## Django admin & internal tools

*Your admin is a vault door with a 'push' sign on it.*

# MAKE STUDENTS HAPPY 😊

Our mission:  
Every customer.  
Every time.

### LIVE REQUESTS

1,248

-22% vs last hour



### REQUESTS BY TYPE



### AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME

2m 45s

-15% vs last hour



Great service  
builds strong  
connections.



### CHARGE ACTIVITY

🔍 [View details](#)

### LATEST TICKETS

- #128795 I can't access my account 2m ago
- #128792 Payment failed 3m ago
- #128790 How to reset password? 5m ago
- #128789 Error on checkout page 6m ago
- #128799 Update billing info 7m ago

### SERVICE STATUS

🟢 All Systems Operational

We're here to help.

# What goes wrong with default admin

## **Direct model edits**

Bypass your state machine

## **delete\_selected on money**

Almost never what you want on a payment, refund, or ledger entry

## **Support 'quick fixes'**

Unauditable changes to ledger state

## **is\_superuser = True**

Accountability black hole

# Make the admin boring on purpose

## Read-only by default

Financial models read-only in admin

# Make the admin boring on purpose

## Four-eyes / dual control

Refunds above a threshold require a second approver

# Make the admin boring on purpose

## Action-level audit log

Who, when, why, before/after, ticket ID...

# Make the admin boring on purpose

## Permission groups

No superusers

# Make the admin boring on purpose

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## Action-level audit log

Who, when, why, before/after, ticket ID...

## Permission groups

No superusers.

# 06

## Observability & incident response

*You will be on call for this. Make 3 a.m. you grateful.*

# Log decisions, not payloads

```
logger.info(  
    "payment.captured",  
    extra={  
        "payment_id": payment.id,  
        "amount": payment.amount,  
        "currency": payment.currency,  
        "status": "captured",  
        "user_id": user_id,  
        "request_id": request_id,  
    },  
)
```

- **Structured logs** with a stable schema. `extra={...}`
- **Redact centrally** PII / PAN / tokens
- **Decision + hash** log what was decided plus a hash of the input
- **Correlate by both** request id and a business id

# Alert on shape changes, not absolutes

 **Ratio over absolutes**

Compare ratio values:  $\text{errors} / (\text{success} + \text{errors})$


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 **Ratio over absolutes**




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 **Failed verifications**





Investigate spikes in any segment



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-  **Ratio over absolutes**      Compare ratio values:  $\text{errors} / (\text{success} + \text{errors})$
-  **Failed verifications**      Investigate spikes in any segment
-  **Any deviations**      Drift in either direction is a warning sign

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-  **Ratio over absolutes**      Compare ratio values:  $\text{errors} / (\text{success} + \text{errors})$
-  **Failed verifications**      Investigate spikes in any segment
-  **Any deviations**      Drift in either direction is a warning sign
-  **New everything**      First-seen card BIN, geolocation is an anomaly

WORK.  
EXPLOIT.  
REPEAT.



ACCESS GRANTED

ROOT LEVEL ADMIN  
AUTHENTICATING PROCESS  
SESSION ID: 00000001  
STATUS: COMPLETED

# Think like an attacker

- 1 What if this runs twice?
- 2 What if this runs simultaneously?
- 3 What if this request is replayed in 30 days?
- 4 What does the audit log look like? Who would notice if it didn't?
- 5 If I had your access for 5 minutes, what would I do?

# Six things to take home

**1**

**Lock the row,**  
not the request.

**2**

**Idempotency is a feature,**  
not a workaround.

**3**

**State machines beat**  
status strings.

**4**

**Verify with defence layers**  
compare\_digest, raw bytes, a clock.

**5**

**Admin is production,**  
treat it like production.

**6**

**Log decisions, observe anomalies**  
watch any deviations carefully.

# Thank You

*Build payments like the world is watching.*

**Dmytro Khmelenko**